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With over 116 federal regulatory agencies on the books, the impact
of their actions is far-reaching. Studies performed by internal
governmental review and by private research organizations show that
approximately 10.2* of the yearly construction costs were allocated
for regulatory controls. A 1975 GAO report showed a growth rate of over
10,000 new regulations each year between 1970 and 1975, at an annual budget
of $60 billion for all the federal regulatory agencies. The percentage
cost of social, labor, and environmental regulations per construction
project can be summed up in the following:
Inflation - Unknown
WAGE Laws - Unknown
EE0 rulings - 12.5%
MBE rulings - 3.6%
0SHA regs - 1.8%
EPA regs - 3.0%
Although the percentages are not cumulative, figures show that the
costs are significant. The complex nature of this problem makes any
analysis very subjective and open to debate. The political debate over
social, labor, and environmental impact on construction has been waged
for a number of years. There still remains much uncertainty about the
full impact of federal reaulations on the construction industry and it
largely depends on social opinion and the current administration as to
which way the pendulum will swing.
!CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The United States has become the most industrialized nation in the
world within the last one hundred years. Along with the Drol i feration
of the industrial revolution at the turn of the century came the
complexities of managing the rapid growth of the American economy.
Americans witnessed the transformation of small family-owned businesses
into large international conglomerates, employing hundreds of thousands :"
of workers. Major factors that affected this dramatic change in the ;-,
.•
•
face of our nation were its abundant resources, the imagination and ?
creation of its people, and the form of government that allowed for i-
unimpeded growth. ^'
Men of vision and wealth quickly moved to harness America's resources
and turn them into a monetary gain. Their drive became so obsessive




monopolies wherever possible. The American society was not going to allow f.
these policies to run rampant and began pressuring the federal government
to intervene, and thereby caused regulatory controls to be placed on
various areas of industry. As much as any other industry, the construction
industry has felt the impact of federal regulations.
The purpose of this paper is to describe the economic, social , and
environmental factors that have influenced the growth of federal
regulations and to describe the specific impacts, both positive and
f J
r.
negative. In most reaulatory concerns, government intervention is in
the "best interest" of the public, therefore, when doing any type of
cost analysis, it is extremely difficult to put a dollar value on the
"best interest" of the public. The analyst is merely adding individual
speculation when valuing time, life, and the quality of the environment.
It is of general consensus that the major impacts on the construction
industry have come from social, labor, and environmental regulations,
therefore, the preponderance of this paper will be spent dealing with
issues in these areas. No one can attempt to assess the impact of
federal regulations unless they understand how and why they came into
being; therefore, this paper will present a brie f background of the
advent and growth of government regulations. After looking at the impact
and results of these regulations, comments will be made on what is
currently beinq done in the area of regulatory reform and projections
will be made on the outlook of future reform. The social pendulum swings






"Regulation", as defined by Webster is a "rule, ordinance cr law
by which conduct is regulated". In a business sense, regulation has been
more aptly defined by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, in its
January 1977 Report ("Study on Federal Regulation", Vol. I) as "one
which has decision-making authority, establishes standards or guidelines
conferring benefits and imposing restrictions on business conduct, operates
principally in the sphere of domestic business activity, has its head and/or
members appointed by the Presi dent. . .[generally subject to Senate
confirmation], and nas its legal procedure generally governed by the
Administrative Procedure Act."
Of all the regulators that effect our everyday life, the federal
government is the largest. Virtually everything it does has a controlling
impact on some part of society. Without exception, the construction
industry has been seriously impacted by the onslaught of federal regulations.
The commerce clause of the Constitution grants to the government the
legal authority to regulate. Article I, Section 8 empowers Congress
"to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states..."
Moreover, there are two categories of regulations: (1) "Traditional"
regulations that are usually aimed at specific industries and pursues








industry lines and oursues non-economic objectives. ExamDles of these
"new" agencies are the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Environmental ^
Protection Agency (EPA). >
The General Accounting Office (GAO), in a 1978 reDort on government
regulatory activities put the number of independent and executive branch \
agencies engaged in regulation at 116. Admittedly, the regulatory powers
and activities of each agency varies, but they all have a definite impact
on the private sector. ;•
REASONS FOR REGULATION \
I
The American economy combines both private ownership with public
control. Any enterprise that beats on the "public interest" demands a
measure of public oversight. Regulations that deal with public welfare
are aimed at protecting the health and safety of people as workers or as
consumers. The basic purpose of regulation is to correct for market
failures, either where competition does not exist or where resources are
not allocated properly. One of the most common areas for regulation is
where a "natural monopoly" exists, i.e., electric power and utilities.
The economies of scale in these industries are so great that the largest
firm would have the lowest costs and therefore could drive its competition
2
out of business. Hence, Congress passed laws amd the Executive Branch
of the Government enacted policies and executive orders to the commodities
market and the labor force to induce a competitive market.
Destructive competition - that could lead to deterioration of product
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may also be necessary tj guarantee services to areas that would otherwise
be ignored by the market, such as train and airline service to small towns.
However, the added cost of these services are passed on to others that do
not benefit from them.
Areas in which the nature of the goods being bought is so complex
that consumers may be incapable of making intelligent decisions on their
own require some regulation. Drugs, insurance, and medical services are
examples of complex markets. Occupational safety and health regulations
are examples of areas v>here markets work imperfectly because of inadequate
information. Workers do not know the risks they face on various jobs and
may not be able to acquire the necessary information themselves.
Another form of market imperfection which requires regulation
involves what economists call "externalities", where the action of one
person or firm could have a harmful effect on others. Externalities
include air and water pollution which increases the costs of some firms
over the costs of others, as well as increasing society's costs in
environmental clean-up, illness and health care. In these situations,
voluntary steps to deal with these problems could place a company at a
competitive disadvantage, therefore, the only way to ensure fair competition
is through government regulation. In these cases, the benefits of
eliminating these externalities have to be weighed against the cost of
regulation. The difficulty lies in the task of putting a price on human
3
life or on the quality of the environment.
i i
HISTORY OF REGULATION
Regulation is as old as human society. Business regulations can




the Babylonian Coce of Hammu.-abi . The Roman Empire established price
fixing for hundreds of goods ; and during the Middle Ages the Catholic
Sovereigns regulated commerce by setting a "just price." The medieval
feudal organizations in Europe established a mercantilist system, and
carefully regulated cost and quality, as well as production, both directly
and through corporations and trading companies.
The Age of Mercantilism ended, however, after the publication of
The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith in 1776, which was the fundamental
work of modern economics. Smith attacked mercantilism and argued:
The merits of laissez-faire competition was
motivated by the individual for his own
selfish gain, which if let run its course
woul d achieve the best results for all...
Thus, resulted the free competitive market.
Britain and America fully endorsed the use of laissez-faire and
allowed it to go unchecked up until the nineteenth century. Early
America was predominately a rural nation with no great nationwide
businesses, therefore, the government was more interested in encouraging
exploitation of the nation's resources than in controlling their use.
The government exerted its influence on the economy by making internal
improvements, patenting inventions, granting public lands to homesteaders
and railroads, and imposing protective tariffs to nurture infant industries
This era also developed periodic business crises, waste of precious
natural resources, and large-scale social inequity and corruption. A
few businessmen came to disprove Smith's theory of free competition, by
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Governmental regulations that existed in the nineteenth century were
orovided almost entirely by statutes and enforced in the traditional
manner - through the court system. The courts Droved to be inconsistent,
ineffective, and immobile in dealing with the complexities of the modern
industrial economy. Therefore, their failure paved the way for
administrative controls through agencies and commissions. Under this
system, the legislature provided only the broad mandate for a particular
regulatory scheme, and allowed the agency authority to implement more
specific guidelines. The agencies and commissions were given power to
prescribe regulations having the force of law, to police those subject
to its authority, and to decided cases involving possible violations -
legislative, executi ve, and judicial power all in one body. In theory,
the agency would be able to provide the continuous supervision and expert
knowledge that could not be expected of the legislature. Up until this
point agencies such as the Army Corps of Engineers (1824), Patent and
Tradesmark Office (1836), Comptroller and Currency (1363), Copyright Office
of the Library of Congress (1870), Bureau of Fisheries (1871), Internal
Revenue Service (1862), and the Civil Service Commission (1883), were set
up to facilitate administration of the government itself.
Behind landmark Supreme Court cases of Munn vs Illinois and Wabash
,
St. Louis and Pacific Railway Co. vs. Illinois
,
Congress established the
first federal regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC),
which was brought about with the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of
1887. Robert E. Cushman explained the importance of this event in his
book The Independent Regulatory Commissions :
.-«
The crucial oroDiem in 1 S37 was not whether railroads
ougnt to oe regulated; it was whether the time had
come for the national government to take over the task
of regulation. The Interstate Commerce Commission was
an innovation not because it was endowed with a new
tyDe of oower, but because it reDresented a new
location of power in the federal system.
The ICC extended governmental authority from Dunishing wrongful acts
after they were committed to preventing their occurrence.
DEVELOPMENT OF REGULATORY AGENCIES
The ICC and its organizational setup served as the prototype for
regulation by independent commissions as federal regulatory powers
expanded into other areas of industry and commerce. As the ICC was
tasked to oversee broader areas of commerce, additional congressional
laws were passed to give it more power. Even with this increased power
the ICC could not handle the full load placed upon it, therefore, Congress
created a series of new agencies, patterned after the ICC, beginning with
the Federal Reserve System (1913), the Federal Trade Commission (1914),
the Tariff Commission (1916), Commodities Exchange Authority (1922), the
Federal Communications Commission (1934) and the National Labor Relations
Board (1935). As industries became more complex, the government saw a
need for federal oversight.
President Roosevelt's New Deal Era provided a high-water mark for
the creation of regulatory agencies intended to ensure certain economic
goals. It also set the stage for the proliferation of non-economic or
social regulation that characterized the late I960' s and 1970's. A 1949
"Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions", included in the Hoover
a
.*,
v Commission ReDort, summed up the arguments that traditionally have been
a
'
advanced in support of the independent commission system:
i~'~e purpose of regulation should ie to :orrect dt
prevent abuses without 7 ~peding the effective
ODeration of the industry or imposing unnecessary
expense or waste.
.•/ This can be done only if regulation is
framed with knowledge cf the conditions of the
industry. Otherwise, the rules will either fail





is frequently complex or highly technical. Its
problems can be understood only on the basis of
•';] constant study and analysis of the developments of
the industry. Thus the regulating agency must be
able to give continuous attention to the area of
v regulation in order to achieve this essential
*."" familiarity or expertness.
v The commission form is designed to assure
^ expertness or at least familiarity with the problems
of the regulated field both through the members of
the commission and through the staff. Devoting
V their full time to the particular industry or activity,
the staff and members become fully familiar with the
technical aspects of the industry and its basic




SURGE OF REGULATIONS IN THE 1970 'S
Although many of the najor "old line" regulatory agencies were
established during the New Deal Era, the early 197G's saw a new wave of
federal regulations ride the crest of public outcry. Headed by people
'.'[- such as Ralph Nader and Senator Proxmire, and groups such as Greenpeace
—i and The Sierra Club, both social and environmental issues were brought to
the forefront. Agencies such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
v (EEOC), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC), and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) were formed. The energy crisis of the early 1970 '
s
caused Congress to try to put together a comprehensive national energy
policy. Therefore, in 1973, Congress set up the Federal Energy
Administration.
Not only has the number of regulatory agencies grown, but also the
number of employees. The EPA which employed 3,860 persons in 1970 had
10,678 persons by 1980. OSHA increased from 1,558 positions in 1972 to
2,799 by 1980. Within the first month of OSHA's creation, the agency
had adopted over 4,400 standards from existing federal regulations,
industry codes and the National Standards Institute. The ICC also grew
from 1.060 positions in 1951 to 1,880 positions in 1980.
Although the budgets of regulatory agencies are only a small
fraction of the total federal budget, it has been estimated that the
operating costs of 41 agencies grew from $2.2 billion in fiscal year
1974 to $4.8 billion in fiscal year 1979, a growth of 115 percent




GENERAL OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL, LABOR AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
As described earlier in this paper, there are some 116 active
regulatory agencies within the federal qovernemt and hundreds more
state and local agencies. To try to estimate their total impact on the
construction industry would be an impractical, as well as an impossible
task. However, not surprisingly, Pareto's Law of 80% of the cost can
be found in 20% of the items applies in the area of federal regulations.
Consequently, this paper will focus on the areas of federal regulations
that have the greatest impact on the construction industry - namely factors
influencing inflation, wage law decisions, Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO]
rulings, Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) regulations, OSHA, and EPA
regulations. It is generally perceived by both owners and contractors
in both small and large firms that these five areas have added considerably
to business frustration and business failure.
There have been several studies conducted to attempt to determine
the cost of social, labor, and environmental regulations as applied to a
specific construction project. Enno Koehn reported the results of a survey
conducted in 1976 designed to determine the percentage of construction
cost spent for social and environmental controls for various sources of
pollution. The results of his research are found in Table 3.1 which
indicated that approximately 10.2% of the yearly construction costs were
allocated for regulatory controls.
11
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TABLE 3.1 - SOCIAL ANC ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF CONSTRUCTION
SOURCES OF POLLUTION APPROXIMATE PERCENTAGE OF
CONSTRUCTION COST SPENT FOR
SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROLS
Runoff, Drainage and Ground-
Water Control
Clearing and Grubbing, Felling
Trees and Stumping
Excavation















Source: Journal of the Construction Division, ASCE
Vol. 104, No. C02, June 1978
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DATA BASE
The data in Table 3.1 was obtained by distributing a questionnaire
to a selected number of construction firms. Those firms receiving the
questionnaire were "The ENR 400" as compiled by Engineering News Record
,
and smaller firms as those that appeared in "The OCA Directory" as published
by the Ohio Contractors Association. These firms represented a combined
construction volume of $65 billion.
The questionnaire utilized is shown as Figure 3-1. A total of 195
usable responses were returned representing a total volume of $8,923
bi 11 ion
.
In complying with all of the federal regulations on construction
projects it has added considerably in the cost of prequal i fi cation,
record keeoinq, monitoring, testinq, and administration. These costs
get passed on directly to the client, and moreover, construction delays
have resulted in signi fi cant cost increases. Each of the areas that have
a dramatic impact on the cost of construction shall be looked at in
further detai 1 .
14
SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CCS~S IN CONSTRUCTION
Have social and environmental controls on





Do you feel that :
Good accepted construction practices satisfy Yes
these requirements of social and environmental
controls?
Do you •feel that the requirements of the Yes
environmental and social control laws and
regulations apply to the work of your
company?
Please list the apDroximate percentage of
construction cost spent by your company for
social and environmental controls due to
present requirements of:
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
Delays attributable to Federal, State, and City
Agencies, or ordered by the Courts
Other Causes (Please explain)
No
No




Source: Journal of the Construction Division, ASCE




IMPACT OF INFLATION ON THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
The impact of inflation on the construction industry has permeated
into all aspects of the industry. Owners are not only paying for the
increased costs of materials, ? abor, and canital but also for premiums
.
on construction prices because of uncertainties of inflation and its
side effects. Contractors are faced with a high degree of uncertainty
in bidding and financing work. Productivity is affected because '/.
contractors cannot accurately forecast long-term returns on their •>
investments and are required to channel necessary capital to meet r
resource costs. \<
In the purest sense inflation is an economic term which applies to
the disproportionate and relatively sharp and sudden increase in the
quantity of money, or credit, or both, relative to goods available for V
.
purchase. Inflation produces a general rise in price levels but, more V-
importantly , causes a decrease in the monetary unit with time, and these
consequences are proportionate to the rate of inflation. In construction,
it is vitally important to be aware of the impact of inflation because if
not taken into consideration, the possible outcomes include selecting £
incorrect alternatives, underestimating budgets, and overstating profits.
Some think that inflation is a neutral factor because of indexing, which
is a means of discounting actual dollars to "real" or inflation-adjusted £





highly susceptible to inflation. Probably the two major areas of cost
increases in the last fifteen years have been wages and energy.
Labor - The industry has shown an overall annual pay increase of
10-11" in 1981 and 1982 according to an Engineering News-Record report.
With interest rates plummeting, construction starts should increase
dramatically causing further increases in pay rates.
Materials - Construction materials make ud approximately 55% of the
cost. The various concentration levels of resources have caused the cost
of procuring those resources to fluctuate, thereby making the impact of
inflation difficult to estimate.
such as individual orice distortions or hidden costs resulting from the
inability to forecast return on one's investment. Still others in the
construction industry try tc ignore inflation, believing it to be a
temporary phenomenon, but logic and experience teach us that inflation




FACTORS AFFECTED BY INFLATION
This chapter will provide a thumbnail sketch of the areas in which
inflation impacts the construction industry, but will more importantly
show how and why federal regulations "fuel the flames" of inflation.
Inflationary regulations by the Federal Reserve or Labor Department
escalate interest rates which cause those increases to be passed
on to the consumer.





Equi pment - Equipment costs are labor-dependent, thereby making it very
sensitive to market and interest rates. Equipment intensive projects







Inte^st Rates - When contractors decide whether to undertake
construction projects, they must consider interest rates because
contractors often ocerate on borrowed money, thereby making interest
rates critically important to the construction industry.
Overhead Costs - Overhead costs for most firms consist primarily of
supervisory salaries and general office and administrative expenses.
Overhead cost increases as the inflation rate increases.
Taxes - Depreciation allowances erode as the inflation rate goes up,
causing a significant impact on the owner's ability to finance new
projects. Depreciation is also a major consideration in the purchase
of construction equipment which o ffsets large capital outlays.
Profits - Profits in the construction industry are reduced by the
aforementioned factors. Additionally inflated cash flows distort the
profitability picture causing construction firms to believe that they are
better off financially than they really are.
Many factors go into the determination of the inflationary effects of
federal regulations. Many economists point to the consumer price index
(CPI) as a gauge of inflation, however, the CPI does not tell the whole
story, and consequently usinij a cost/benefit criterion method we get a
more accurate picture of the factors that cause inflationary effects on
the construction industry. It has been recognized that the major deter-
minants of the rate of inflation are fiscal policy and monetary policy.
However, any change - from any source - that increases aggregate supply,
decreases the real inflation rate, in a real sense, when a governmental
action provides benefits in terms of a cleaner environment, safer







benefits exceeds the associated cost, then the aagregate suDply of real
goods and services available to the public has increased. In such a case,
the effect would be anti-inflationary, even though a meticulous tracing
of its effect on the C?I might show an inflationary effect. On the other
hand, if a proposed regulation would have costs exceeding its benefits,
then that regulation must be judged inflationary, since it diminishes
the real supply of goods and services available to the public.
Between 1970 and 1975, there was a 25% annual growth rate in the
number of federal regulations published. There was an average in excess of
10,000 new regulations each year; and in a 1975 report conducted by the GA0,
regulatory controls cost $60 billion to the economy. This has caused
many to question as to whether the quality of regulatory decision making
has kept pace with the growth and quantity of the regulatory outout.
i
DEFICIENCIES IN REGULATORY DECISION MAKING
In our regulatory agencies we have seen a number of deficiencies in
their decision making processes. Several of these deficiencies are
1) making important decisions based in insufficient information,
2) promulgating regulations whose costs clearly outweigh benefits,
3) failing to consider the cost-effectiveness of component parts of a
proposal, 4) failing to consider alternative approaches, and 5) a tendency
to protect industry from competition. Hopefully, with a better under-
standing of these problems, the regulatory agencies, Congress, and others
may be better able to wrestle with the problem of improving regulatory








IMPORTANT DECISIONS 3ASED UPON INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION
In many cases when issues come before one of the regulatory agencies
not all necessary evidence is brought before the agency. In some cases,
what should be "interested parties" are unaware of the sta<e they have
in the outcome of the regulation and therefore fail to present their views.
On other occasions, the agency just does a poor job in obtaining the basic
information of the issue, and consequently, issues are decided in a vacuum.
Moreover, when the general public becomes aware that regulations which
affect them have been so cavalierly promulgated without serious consideration
being given to the costs and benefits, they tend to lose faith in all
governmental institutions.
PROMULGATING STANDARDS WHEN COSTS CLEARLY EXCEED BENEFITS
Many instances have been found where regulatory agencies have pressed
forward with regulations even when they knew that the costs far exceeded
the benefits. Some cases were mandated by Congress, but others fell
victim to regulatory inertia: where the proposal had gotten fairly far
along before anyone discovered its real impact; in effect it was
"too-late" to turn it around.
FAILING TO CONSIDER THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPONENT PARTS OF A PROPOSAL
In many cases the overall proposal may be justified in terms of costs
versus benefits, however, seldom has there been a value engineering approach





FAILING TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
In numerous cases regulatory aqencies have held stedfastly to
traditional views and outdated standards, and have refused to consider
,-, . „ , , , u i.v
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innovative approaches to problems. A spin-off of the value engineering
approach is the production of alternative approaches to the problem.
-
Each apDroach is evaluated and its benefits are computed. Unfortunately,
all too often, agencies are tied ud by legislative mandates or internal
policy. Sadly, it has been disclosed that many agencies simply do not I




TENDENCY TO PROTECT INDUSTRY FROM COMPETITION
It has been observed that in the regulatory decision making process
there has been a tendency of the agencies to protect their constituent
industry from competition. The irony here is that the regulators have *
ended up protecting the regulated. Regulatory agencies are established
to protect the consumer, however, often the effects of their actions
have increased the cost to the consumer and have increased the rate of
4
. ,, .. 8inflation.
When considering the impact of inflation on the construction industry
I
one must address the degree of risk involved in contracting. When dealing
directly with the costs and prices of labor, materials, and equipment
one can reasonably forecast one or two years ahead. Beyond that time •"
the degree of uncertainty becomes progressively greater.
.-
STUOIES ON THE IMPACT OF INFLATION ON THE CONSTRUCTION INDUST RY '-
In a study performed by De Neufville, Hani, and Lesage from 1966-1975,
they found that contractors are more risk-adverse durinq periods of high
.•
inflation, in bad years they bid relatively lower because they attach
9 flittle importance to greater immediate gains. t
L
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Another study performed by Erikson, O'Connor, and Rood cublished
in 1973, examined the risks in government-type contracts by owners and
contractors. They found that during periods of high inflation:
1. Both owner and contractor tend to reduce profit marains. In the long
run, the gambling contractor goes bankrupt, and both owner and contractor
lose because of delay and litigation.
2. Competition is eventually reduced. Contractors are less able to
bid because the probability of loss is catastrophic.
3. The owner will be paying contingency costs that may be more than they
are real ly worth.
4. If the uncertain events do not occur, the contractor may realize a
windfall profit at the owner's expense.
The aforementioned effects were based on f^xed-price contracts. Other
type contracts such as cost-reimbursable contracts could reduce contractor
risks. Escalation clauses also reduce contractor risks, however, the
Associated General Contractors (AGC) is opposed to the inclusion of
escalation clauses in contracts.
Cost-estimation accuracy fluctuates as the interest rate fluctuates.
Short-term projects of 3-6 months can be estimated with accuracy, however,
if a project is scheduled to last from 12-18 months or more, then contractors
add contingency fees in their bid to hedge against inflation.
!
SUMMARY
The construction industry is not fully aware of the impact of
inflation. Inflation discriminates among competitors, where larger fims
are more able to absorb the effects of inflation than ore smaller firms.
The true costs to owners and contractors are rising faster than the prices
•
12
causing the constant dollar profits to diminish. Inflation also causes
the benefits of taxation and deDreciation to decrease.
Regulatory agencies must work to reduce the number and kinds of
decision making deficiencies. The general public has little concept of
how regulations effect inflation. They tend to think that they are being
given a "free lunch", and not realizing that the pursuit of regulatory
objectives has had a substantial cost - one which the consumer has
had to pay. Additionally, regulatory agencies have no "bottom line"
which measures the success or failure cf regulatory policies. Since they
are the "only game in town," they follow traditional policies and do
little value engineering to develop further cost savings and overall
improvements in their programs.




IMPACT OF WAGE LAWS ON THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
Within the United States publicly funded construction accounts for
approximately one-third of the annual value of all construction done.
Whenever public funds are used to finance construction a number of
special contractual provisions are incorporated into the construction
contract. Many of these provisions are regarded by the industry as a
result of inflation, but by far the Davis-Bacon Act has been the most
highly contested regulation and has generated the most political contro-
versy.
There has been several studies done to estimate the impact of wage
laws on the cost of construction, but because of the wide dispersion of
hourly wages paid in each skill area throughout the United States an
accurate and valid survey has not been conducted to date. Proponents,
therefore, of each side of the controversy start by making assumptions
and then proceed with their argument. It is the basis of these
assumptions that make their conclusions suspect.
THE COWPS STUDY
A comprehensive study performed by the Council on Wage and Price
Stability (COWPS) found some surprising results. Using recent Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) data on both nonunion and union wages, COWPS
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in tiie same geographical area. Generally, the di* ference was due to
\
i
reporting lags. Additionally the Davis-Bacon Act only sets minimum wages
and any union contractor would have to pay the current contractual wage.
Most importantly, the COWPS Study experimented with different administrative
rules for setting a "prevailing wage." In one experiment, it compared the
percentage difference between an "average" of union and ODen-shop rates in
an area and the straight "union" rate. For the most part, the "union"
rate was not significantly qreater than the "average" rate; the average
difference between the two ways of computing the prevailing waqe was only j
3%. Although these margins are relatively small and could be accounted :
for by statistical error, the COWPS authors nonetheless comDuted the
i
possible savings, resulting in $200-600 million in federal construction
costs by adopting an averaging rule. "j
I
i
THE HUD-MIT STUDY }
The Department of Civil Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT), in collaboration with the National Association of
Homebuilders , completed a study in June of 1978 which surveyed wages and
labor management practices in the construction industry. The study was
sponsored by the United States Department of Housing and Urban DeveloDment
(HUD), which surveyed a large number of contractors, both union and non-
union, in eight U.S. cities, and covered a wide range of labor management
issues.
The wage survey and contractor interview data generated for the HUD-
MIT Study correlated a unique comparison of union, open-shop, and Davis-









Boston, Baltimore, New Orleans, Atlanta, Kansas City, 3rand Rapids,
M Denver, and Portland.
Two results stood out from the wage comparisons. First, for commercial
construction, nearly all of the Davis-Sacon rates were identical to the
union rates in each city. In metropolitan areas such as Grand Rapids,
Baltimore, Atlanta, and New Orleans, where there was (and still is) a
significant amount of open-shop commercial construction, the wages were
on the average, substantially lower than union rates. Therefore, the use
cf average wages rather than Davis-Bacon prevailing wages in these cities
would lower nominal labor costs. Due to the dispersion of wage rates in
the open-shop sector, reliance on the "30* rule" virtually guarantees
that the union rate will become the prevailing wage even in relatively
strong ooen-shop areas. The "30% rule" states that if 30* or more of the
mechanics practicing a given trade are paid a single wage, then that shall
be considered to be the prevailing wage. This obviously discriminates in
favor of unions who set a single wage for all union journeymen.
Second, for residential construction, the results of the wage
comparison was much more varied. Three different patterns were evident in
the eight ci ties
:
1. The two cities with relatively low open-shop activity, namely
Boston and Kansas City, had prevailing wages that were identical to union
commercial rates.
2. In both Portland and Denver where there was moderate open-shop
activity, the prevailing rates were higher than the open-shoo average
wages but were significantly lower than fhe union commercial rates.
-*. ••. •. .*. f. ••. *. .-. .'. .-. -•_ •• .- .- .-. «i - . .- _\ .•. .-_ j- .•
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3. In the remaining four cities, which had a nonunion sector, the
prevailing rates were lower than the average open-shoo rate.
With that kind of diversity in results, it is difficult to make a
firm conclusion about the impact of the Davis-Bacon Act on wages - ether
than more study needs to be done. Clearly, the law and its administration
does not tend to raise wages in construction in some cities. While on the
other hand, in cities with large union activity, the union commercial
building rate does tend to spread over all public construction - even
when considerable residential work is apparently open-shop.
INDIRECT COST IMPACT OF THE DAVIS-BACON ACT
The indirect effect of the Davis-Bacon Act adds to the total cost of
federal construction. Typically iqnored are the indirect labor costs borne
by contractors (and passed on to the taxpayer) which arise in the -
administration of the act and the affect on worker productivity.
In most studies the Davis-Bacon wage differential is calculated
by simply assuming that the "sole effect" of the Davis-Bacon Act is to
raise hourly wage rates for each trade from the average nonunion wage
rate to the "prevailing rate," (usually assumed to be the union rate).
For a particular project the sum of all the manhours for each trade is
then multiplied by the wage difference, resulting in the loss or savings
as impacted by the Davis-Bacon "prevailing wage."
The number of manhours required to carry out work are usually
assumed to be the same, no matter whether the "prevailing waqes" or lower
nonunion wages are paid to the workmen. This assumption is iqnored by
most studies, but is a central point in the analysis of the impact of
the Davis-Bacon Act. The findings from the hUD-MIT Study questioned the
/alidity of that assumption 3nd found the "ollowinc result. The '/ace
differential ignored the indirect cost associated with occupational
structure and skill level rigidities, and the costs of i naocroori ate or
redundant training that could result from the Davis-Bacon Act.
The assumption that labor productivity is unrelated to waqe levels
is contrary to most economic theories. Results of the HUD-MIT Survey
concluded the following:
1. Several of the nonunion contractors interviewed pointed out that
by offering higher wages on federal projects they were able to attract
workers with more traininq, expertise, and experience. In loose labor
markets, nonjirfcn contractors recort that unemployed union journeymen will
often apply for work on federa] jobs and make no mention of trcir -ni.n
membersr.i p
.
2. Many nonunion contractors have begun to use the difference between
wages on public jobs and private jobs as a ."eward 'or their most loyal
and productive workers.
3. By attracting highly sailed workers and rewardinq them with
higher wages, it tends to improve worker productivity and duality of
work
.
4. The MIT Construction Project Manacement Group concluded
that improvements in management techniques contribute qreatly to increased
labor production. Therefore, when nonunion contractors are required to
pay hiaher wages, manaqement devotes more attention to selecting, traininq,
and supervision of construction workers.
5. The survey indicated that union journeymen required less
supervision than nonunion workers within comparable trades. The foreman/
zs
journeymen ratio was 1:2 for nonunion firms, while the foreman/ journeyman
ratio for union firms was as high as 1:10. Consequently, the impact of
the Davis-Bacon Act could oossibly result in a reduction in required
supervision for nonunion firms on federal Drojects; this would obviously
result in lower labor costs for construction firms.
Pesults of the HUD-MIT Survey also showed that certain institutional
and legal factors in the construction industry would add to the cost
differential. These are summarized in the following:
1. The Davis-Bacon Act tends to impose union occupational and skill
classifications on the entire construction industry. Even when nonunion
wages are adopted as the "prevailing waae," union trade definitions are
still used and only union skill levels (journeyman, apprentice and 1 aborer)
are permitted. As a consequence, many open-shop contractors who rely on
helpers in most of the skilled trades are forced to either classify these
workers as "jcurneyren" and pay the higher wage, or register them in approved
apprenticeship programs with State Apprentice Councils (SAC) or the Federal
Bureau of Apprenticeship Training in the Department of Labor (BAT). In
order to comply with the SAC and BAT rules, nonunion firms have had to
design apprenticeship proqrams along union craft lines. Thus, the
combination of the Davis-Bacon Act and Federal/State Apprenticeship rules
impose union occupational structures on training in the nonunion sector.
Additionally, contractors who normally cross train men or who use an
undifferentiated work crew have to report their workers under a particular
union occupation. In fact, if the reporting rules were strictly followed,
an open-shop contractor would have to cay a "general building mechanic"
several different rates at different times depending on whether he was
doing ironwork, carpentry, masonry, etc.
;
:
a2. The paperwork involved in the Davis-Bacon reporting requirements
is burdensome and costly. Attempting to accurately report a single worker's
time uncer several occupational classifications would result in additional
recordkeeping and additional resorting cost for the employer. The
estaol i shment of a SAC or BAT approved apprenticeship program adds to
.
the administrative burden.
Contractors are required to continually submit payroll data to the
local Employment Standards Office as evidence that they are in fact
paying the "prevailing wage."
All of these nonwage effects may create higher costs for the
contractor. The most dramat'C nonwage impact is probably the lack of a
"helper" classification, since these semi-skilled mechanics play a larqe
1 3
role in most open-shop firms.
*
THE AGC REPORT
In a report perfor-ed by the Associated General Contractors for
submission to the White House and to Congress in 1983, they cited several
other problems with wage laws that increased construction costs: [
1. The Labor Department will give covered construction
contractors only partial credit for contributions to fringe
benefit programs unless the contractors make the same
contributions whenever they perform private work.
2. The Labor Department has faileo to recognize that
the scope of a job clarification may vary from one ar^a
to another according to area practice.
3. If a federal aqency does not award a contract within
ninety days of bid opening, then the Labor Department ^ay force
an after-the-fact channe in the applicable wage rates, leaving
the low bidder with only two alternatives: accept the new rates
or demand that the contract be rebid.
30
•i
. 'he Labor Cecartrent has induced off-site work
in Us wage determinations.
5. The Labor Department requires covered construction ..
contractors to suomit their payroll records on weekly basis.
SL'VVAP.Y
Surveys indicate that the Davis-Bacon Act, along wiLh state and local
Di-evailing wage laws tend to raise hourly wages on federal projects.
The Davis-Bacon "prevailing wages" tend to fall between the t-ue area
average rates and union journeyman rates for most crafts in the cities
surveyed. As explained earlier, as the wage increases, productivity
increases at the same time, indirect nonwage effects of the Davis-Bacon
Act. will tend to increase its cost impact beyond any increase in productivity
Most studies perforr-ed require that certain assumptions be mode and a key
issue in the Davis-Bacon analysis is whether these assumptions are valid.
Both parties in tlie Davis-Bacon debate will continue to strengthen their
positions in order to force regulatory controls in their favor, however,
it is generally agreed that further research needs to be done to accurately
determine the true impact of the prevailing wage laws on the construction
industry. During the period when union activity was at its height, the
regulatory pendulum swung far in favor of strong governmental controls.
Now that other externalities have come into play, the need for stringent
wage laws is being questioned. The indications are clear that the








EOUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY REGULATIONS
i
IMPACT OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY (EEO) REGULATIONS ON THE
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
The construction industry represents approximately 10* of the gross
national product. As technology becomes more complex and is incorporated
into the construction industry, the need for qualified skilled workers
will increase. For a number of years the training of these workers has
been through union apprentice programs. In recent years, there has
developed a number of other methods to train and obtain qualified skilled
workers, however, this chapter will address the more traditional view.
In the past, membership into many of these apprentice programs has been
restricted predominately to white male workers. This produced a pre-
dominately white male construction force with no minority or female
representation. Here again, the government, acting in the best interest"
of the qeneral public, stepped in and enacted several pieces of legislaion
to correct the situation.
Federal intervention in the construction industry became very active
in 1945 when states established fair employment practices statutes. During
the 1950's and early 1960's the civil rights movement shook the American
conscience, highlighted by the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964.
This Act also established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
to enforce and administer its rulings. At first the EEOC could only
m




however, in 1372 with the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, ';.
the EEOC received direct enforcement authority to bring suit against
discriminatory organizations. In 1976, the Federal Executive Agency /
(FEA) guidelines were enacted to ensure eaual opportunity in federal
contracts. In 1978, the EEOC guidelines and tne FEA guidelines were
combined to establish one uniform set of requirements under Executive ]i
Order No. 11246. This order also established the Office of Federal \
Contract Compliance (OFCCP). JT
The EEOC and the OFCCP set specific goals and timetables to comply ;-*.
with their regulations. Many firms have had to modify, reorganize, or \-
refuse to comply with these regulations and have consequently seen their [
construction costs soar. Others, as a part of good management, have used
foresight and planning to make the transition into. compl iance with the
EEOC and OFCCP rul ; ngs smooth, thereby, causing little disruption in
operation and minimal cost increase.
The EEO regulations have caused an adversarial relationship to develop /
between two factions of our society: 1) those who want to see EEO regulations
abolished, citing increased cost and poor success, and 2) those organizations ;.
such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and
the Woman's Equity Action League, who feel that without specific goals and
timetables, there are no reviewable standards to determine if a contractor |
has used good faith efforts to implement an affirmative action plan. ,
According to recent U.S. Department of Labor reports from 1972-1980,
they show that black representation has increased sharply in seven skilled
labor crafts and has only decreased slightly in three skilled labor crafts.
«
The EEOC has, therefore, seen progress in the construction industry.
^-J
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Under ihe current Reagan admini strati on, the EEOC's "wheels of orogress"
are coning to a grinding halt. Many policies have been modified or abolished
and the whole organization is in jeopardy of being cut out. Just as the
pendulum swung far in favor of affirmative action and civil rignts in the
1 960
' s and 70's. Ve recent administrative policy trend has caused the
pendulum to swing the other way.
DATA BASE
A study was performed by Koehn and Jones in 1982 to determine the
approximate percentage of construction cost for complying with EEO
regulations. A questionnaire was sent to a selected number of contractors.
The questionnaire was sent to firms listed in "The EN R 400," and also to
smaller firms - those firms that were members of the Associated General
Contractors, B^niing Chapter and the Indiana Constructors Inc. (highway,
heavy, and utility contractors). By surveying both groups, a wide range
of companies, annual construction volumes, and comments were obtained.
The questionnaire is shown as Figure 6-1.
There were 146 usable responses returned representing a total
construction volume of over $10 billion. As a result of the organizations
surveyed, approximately 63' of the firms felt that EEO regulations
applied to the type of work they performed. Roughly 70" of the contractors
agreed that EEO regulations have increased the cost of projects with
which they have been involved. Additionally, it was interesting to note
that a large majority of the firms felt that EEO regulations did not benefit
the general public or the individual contractor. Only 55.' of the ENR 400
firms and 31". of the Indiana Constructors feU that EEO regulations
r*' ' ^— y-'T - - ^'— » * « — m jm *"m 7 i^i^-yt'-yw » " i "— —" i >m\"^m-ma^v* m <*v rn vm^*w c*
COST OF EEO REGULATIONS
Have Equal Employment ODportunity (EEO) Hardly at all
r3gulations increased the cost of construction
projects with which your organization is
involved? Substantially
Quite a bit
Do you feel that EEO regulations benefit: Yes No Unsure
(a) The General Publ ic
Yes No Unsure
(continued on following page)
I
(b) The Contractor
(c) The Construction Worker
(Minority and Female)
(d) The Construction Worker '•
(other than in (c) above)
I
(e) Other (Please Explain)
Do you feel EEO regulations apply to the
type work with which your company is
involved? '.
I
Do good general personnel Dractices usually
satisfy EEO requirements?
Should the EEO regulations be modified?
If yes, please comment below.
Have EEO regulations increased the
number of minorities and females on your
projects?
-"
Have EEO regulations increased the J
number of qualified minorities and £
females on your projects?
I
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Please list tne total project
cost and approximate cost of
complying with EEO regulations





















Bldgs (Residential & Commercial
Hi ghways
Heavy (including sewer work)
Industrial (including power
plants)
Other Causes (Please Explain)
Approximate Annual Construction Cost (in dollars)




Source: Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, ASCE
Vol. 109, No. 4, Dec. , 198?
benefited minority and female "orders. It is noteworthy -0 point out
that the ENR 400 (the larger firms) group felt that it was easier to
satisfy EEO regulations and saw a benefit in the requirements, than did
the Indiana Constructors (the smaller firms). Most firms, both large
and small, indicated that EEO regulations had not increased the number of
qualified minorities and females on the construction site. The overall
cost of EEO regulations as a percentage of construction cost were:
1 .05% for ENR 400 firms and 2.31" for the Indiana Constructors. It should
also be noted that in a study headed by Koehn in 1976 distributed to a
similar group showed a much higher oercentage of construction cost spent
in complying with EEO regulations. The ENR 400 firms reported 2.0% and
the Ohio Contractor Directory Firms reported 3.4% to comply with EEO
regulations. This difference can be explained by either a change in
EEO policies or administration, or firms are becoming more familiar with
EEO requirements and are incorporating EEO standards into their own
management policies.
In a separate study performed by the Arthur Anderson and Company,
for the Business Roundtable, they reported that for the year 1977 over
S217 million was spent in complying with EEO regulations by the 48
companies that participated in their study. $209 million, or 96% of
those costs were operating and administrative. Within the different
categories of EEO regulations, over 76% of the total cost was spent on
affirmative action programs.
EEO regulations required the participating companies to complete more
than 3 million pages of information in 1977 in order to supply and main-
tain records that provided proof of compliance. Participating companies
"
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In a report performed by the Associated General Contractors for
submission to the White House and to Congress in 1983, tney cited several
other problems with EEO regulations that increased construction costs:
•;i; 1. At least until 1981, OFCCP placed such a great
"0 emphasis on detailed paperwork that its compliance reviews
almost inevitably found "deficiencies" in construction
contractors' affirmative action programs, providing the
£ agency with an excuse to demand that contractors sign
burdensome conciliation agreements.
2. The Carter administration's "Midnight Regulations"
would require many federal and federally assisted construction
contractors to develop and implement affirmative action programs
l* for the non-craft personnel at each of their establishments.
Li [*Note - stayed by the Reagan administration]
3. OFCCP has sought to exercise jurisdiction over all
/! of the work of all federal and federally assisted construction
contractors, even though much of the work is private.
P 4. The 16 affirmative action steps included in federal
and federally assisted construction contracts create an
enormous paperwork burden (OFCCP has subdivided the 16 steps
\ into 117 substeps), and ignore the fundamental need to equip
minorities and women with the skills to contribute to the
construction industry on an ongoing basis. ^7
SUMMARY
The construction industry represents a substantial amount of the
•
-
gross national product, and, therefore, in the'tiest interest' of the
v general public, Congress has enacted EEO regulations to ensure that all
Americans get "their fair share of the pie." It was industrial
fc* abuse by both management and unions that caused the establishment of
N
"






the E£OC. Riding the wave of public momentum the EEOC enacted strict
goals and timetables for full compliance. As a result, most firms 3
have experienced an increase in construction costs. Firms cite high ';'
:
recruiting costs and hic:h trainina costs as major factor for the increase. ,\
As indicated in the study performed by Kcehn and Jones, most firms "J
felt that EEO regulations had not increased the number of qualified *'
minorities and females on the construction site. •':
The Reagan administration has taken a dim view of most affirmative '.1
action programs and has halted most of the actions of the previous
administration. Members of Congress have been made aware by AGC, \
Business Roundtable, and other organizations, that the paperwork burden G|
'a
of recordkeeping and documentation is enormous, and that EEO regulations •*]
need to be modified. It is time for the pendulum to swing back toward >*.
less constraints and more profitability. The need for EEO regulations C
still remains, therefore, the construction industry must incorporate \
EEO policies into its management and make qood faith efforts to meet
EEO goals if true modifications will be forthcoming. [1
q
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iMINORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISE RULES
K
IMPACT OF MINORITY BUSINESS ET£°PqiSE Q'JLSS ON THE CCNST^'JCnON I'^-ST^Y
£ The construction industry is a very competitive business. Statistics
show that 5 out of 6 companies qo out of business within a 10 year
.-! period. Some factors that contribute to these statistics include:
1) the ease with whicn one may enter into the construction industry,
2) the large nur.be r of contractors compared to the available contracts,
and 3) the lack of technical and business knowledge on the part of many
new contractors
.
Despite the fact that these figures relate to all firms, there
has been growing evidence that those companies started and owned by
minorities are even less successful than others within the industry. In
P. order to ensure that minority owned companies were given the opportunity
to succeed in construction, the federal government took steps to aid and
protect them and in 1969, President Nixon, under the auspices of the
s
_
Commerce Department established the Minority Business Enterprise (MBE)
Provision. For this provision, a minority business enterprise shall be
"•* defined as :
1. A small business that is both owned and controlled
by minorities or by women. This means that minorities or
!; women must own at least 51" of the business and that they




3 2. Minorities include Blacks, Hispanics, American
Indians, Alaskan Natives, and Asian Americans.
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or other individuals, found to oe economically disadvantaged
by the Snail Business Administration 1S3A) under Section 5 i
of the Small 3usiness Act, as amended. For this ourocse
minorities are limited to persons who are citizens or lawful
per~ane n t resi dents of the Jnited States.
A. Women are not by definition a minority. Therefore,
businesses owned and controlled by women are included under
the general headinq of Minority Business Enterprise, but are
not to be considered, and may not be utilized to comply with
requirements established for business owned and controlled
by minorities, unless the business is owned and controlled by
a minority woman or nas been aDDroved by the Small Business
Administration under Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act,
as amended.
5. Those firms puroortinq to oe Minority Business
Enterorises (minority or female, or both) shall have on file
a certification (including 8(a) certification) substanti at i nq
their status as a "Minority Business Enterprise" as defined.
Certification will be issued as a Minority Business Enterprise
(MBE) or rtor-pn Business Enterprise (>3E), or both. 18
GROWTH OF THE VSE
In 1971, t h e M inonty Business Enterprise program was succeeded by an
executive order instructing the Commerce department to develop concrete
plans and specific doals in cooperation with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EECC). Yet by 1976, MBE's nad still obtained
less than 1". of the government's construction dollar volume.
It was concluded that discrimination was still a major factor in
the construction industry, therefore, Congress enacted the Public Works
Act of 1977, which not onl/ established additional goals for minority
hiring but, more importantly, stipulated that 10' of the amount of each
public works grant should be expended for minority enterprises. In
effect, this removed approximately SA00 million from the fiscal year
1978 Federal Construction Pudget.
As part 3f che 3ub1 i : torks Act it established a two year pilot
program under wnich one federal agency could .rake all of its contracts
available to the S3A for its MSE Drogran and gave the SBA authority to
waive bonding requirements under certain circumstances for minorities.
In 1980 and 1931, the earlier bills were extended, however, the MBE
established a graduation date for each minority firm in the program,
at which time the minority firm would no longer be eligible for assistance
but had to enter the mainstream of competitive contracting. The VBE
Program has produced some disappointing statistics. Since the establish-
ment of the program, 4,598 minority firms have participated in the program
of these 166 have graduated, and of the 166 less than 1* of the businesses
still remain active (as of 1932).
As a result of its poor showing, the MSE program has received
considerable criticism. It has not effectively produced viable minority
contractors. It has unfortunately created an unproductive process,
olacinq the ill-prepared minority contractor in a tough market, where
even majority f i r^s have difficulty in competing. The program emphasized
setting aside contracts for minority firms but gave little assistance
in prooer management techniques.
DATA BASE
In order to obtain a data base for determining the benefits and
percentage of construction cost spent in complying with M8E rules, a
study was performed by Koehn and Espaillat at Purdue University in 1983,
by distributing a questionnaire to a select number of contractors. All
organizations appearing on "The ENR 400" list as compiled by Engineering
News-Record received the questionnaire. It was also decided to send the
^ U6S t 1 onna i re to 3 numoe r ~ * sma 1 1 e r " i—
s
n e —emfce '"s o * the . nd* ana
Constructors , Inc. [hignway, heavy and utility contractors), and the AGC
of Indiana ( Bui ' ::' n g C°ecte r" were c:^s'-e red to be representative of
smaller contractors. The Questionnaire is shewn as Figure 7.1.
A total of 193 usable questionnaires were returned representing a
total construction volume of ove r $10.6 billion. In general, contractors
believed the ^cst significant items of concern to be that " M5E requirements
should not be mandatory, " that "MBE's create .-ore problems than tney
solve," and that there are "not enough qualified WSE contractors."
Results of the survey shewed that 72* of the ENR 4G0 firms and
84:, of the Indiana Constructors felt that W3E regulations have increased
the cost of projects with which they have been involved. In terms of
construction dollars, tne ENR 400 firms snowed an increase of 3.32'. in
cost per project, and the AGC of Indiana showed an increase of 3.77* in
cost per project. Vost firms felt that ^SE regulations did not benefit
the public. It was interesting to note that a majority of all fims
felt that MBE regulations did in fact increase the nuroer of minority
contractors, but they also agreed that m3E regulations did no_t increase
the number of qualified minority contractors. However, as could be
expected, the larger firms (The ENP 400) felt it less difficult, more
beneficial, and less expensive to comply with MBE regulations than the
smaller firms. Cne explanation for this difference is that the particular
type of work done by the small contractors, such as highway or EPA
financed work, may be subject to greater agency surveillance. Another









to be equivalent to normal operating procedures and, therefore, do not
"
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regulations increase: the cost. of
construction projects *ith *nicn your
: r ization is invcl ved?
Z-c you feel that MBE regul 3 1 i ens enef^t:
(a) The General Publ i c
Jo) The Minority Contractor
(c) The Non- M mcri ty Contractor
(d) The Const ruction Worker (Minority)
o
1
7he CAn S t r 'JC t i On „v>r-, or ( noi-
-inon ty)




3ui te 3 bit
Substantially
v es No 'Jnsure
Do you 'eel VBE "emulations accly to
the type if work *ith which /Our
company is involved?
In general, do unregulated
construction bidding practices
usually satisfy VBE regulations?
In general, do unreouldted
construction contract negotiation
practices usually satisfy MBE
requi ryients?
Have VBE regulations increased the
nurcer of minority contractors on
your orojects ?
Yes No 'Jnsure
(continued on next page)
1-
Yes •lo U n s u re
Have M 2E regulations i "creased the
n'jr:er of qualified minority
contractors on your projects?
Should the MBE regulations be
modified? If yes, please comment
below.
Please list the total project cost
and the approximate cost of
complying with MBE regulations
on projects with which your
organization is involved.
(a) Buildings (Residential and Commercial
(b) Highways
(c) Heavy (including sewer work)
(d) Industrial (including power plants)








Approximate Annual Construction Cost (in dollars)
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feel that they increase project cost. A third reason may be that
certain fixed costs e < i s t but '"ecr-esen: a s~aller rercentace of t n e
total cost for 1arge r f i r—s . In general, ~a;or construction fir~s have
at least one person on t.-e 1 r headquarters staff * n cse resoonsibi 1 i t>
is tne VSE Program. Conversely small contractors often consider the
administration of MSE regulations an aiclec chore for whomever is
avai 1 able.
Sl'MVARY
The M5E was created to try to assist in correcting the wide disparity
in the number of minority contractors to total contractors on federal
projects. The major reason for tne disparity was found to be
discrimination, therefore, the federal government intervened in the
'best interest"of the general public. Riding the wave of the social
movement the "BE gained additional authority and Congress set specific
goals for compliance. vost f i rms were ill-prepared to comply with these
regulations, and unfortunately most minority firms were not prepared to
take advantage of this opportunity. As a result, even as recent as
1902, less than 1* of the minority firms that participated in the
program are still in business. The major factor effecting the dramatic
failure rate was a lack of adequate technical and managerial training.
The survey performed by Koehn and Espaillat showed that most
contractors agreed that ^BE regulations increased the cost of construction -
3.32" for the ENG 400 firms and 3.77"„ for the AGC Indiana Firms. The
great majority of organizations felt that MBE regulations should be modified
It appears, however, that the MBE problem will only be solved when
non-minori ty organi zations in nood faith, and without government coercion,
are given the opportunity to develop a system designed to recruit and
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train minority contractors. Curing the 1970's, the reaulatory pendulum
swung fdr in favor of strict goals in procuring minority contractors
for federal projects. New the tone of Congress and the nation indicates
that the regulatory pendulum will start to swing back the other way,
through modifications of MBE regulations.
:hapter eight
occupational safety and health act (osha) regulations
IMPACT OF OSHA REGULATIONS ON THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
Job awareness and jcbsite safety practices care more into the
public view in the 1960's and 1 9 70 ' s and the news media and published
articles made more and more Americans acutely aware of job hazards.
Major construction jobs were rapidly increasing in complexity
and project award amounts began to reach into the billions of dollars.
Worker fatality and disabling injury rates in the construction industry
were significantly hiqher than the national average. Congress, therefore,
enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970 and also established
an agency to oversee the program. Unfortunately, to most contractors
this piece of legislature and its agency appeared to be punitive,
emphasizing rules, regul ations, and fines.
Data compiled in a 1979 report by the U.S. Department of Labor showed
that the construction industry which consists of only 5 percent of the
total national employment, accounted for approximately 19 percent of all
work related fatalities. The major cause of deaths were falls, 26 percent;
industrial vehicles or equipment, 15 percent; and over-the-road vehicles,
15 percent. Additionally, almost 30 percent of all the deaths from
contact with electric currents occurred to workers in construction.
The report indicated that occupational injury rates (sum of non-lost




from 2.1 in finance, insurance, and real estate to 15.0 in construction.
Lost workday injury rates (using the same methodology) was found to be
7 times greater in the construction industry than in the areas of finance,
insurance, and real estate. The severe injury rate was also found to be
21
nine times greater than those other industries. These statistics are
not as dramatic as they seem to be when one considers the nature and
risks involved in the work areas used for comparison. When the
construction industry was comoared against another hazardous industry,
such as mining, the injury rates for the construction industry were found
to be lower than in the mining industry. OSHA's position was that the
value of human life far exceeded any industry costs to imolement safety
programs, and, therefore, established more regulations with stiffer
penalties and required more documentation by construction companies.
OSHA attemoted to identify and reduce the physical hazards at the work
site, however, it neglected to consider worker behavioral patterns and
management factors that contribute to the accident rate. Probably the
two greatest shortcomings were that 1) OSHA created an adversarial
relationship between the contractor and his employees in the area of safety
and 2) that OSHA has not substantially reduced the accident rate.
Both owners and contractors generally agree that the number of
accidents would not necessarily be greatly reduced even if all hazardous
conditions were eliminated from construction sites. They believe that
the unsafe acts of the workers themselves are responsible, in part, for
22
roughly 85 percent of all construction accidents. The direct and
indirect costs of these accidents has caused significant increases in
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Recent research published by the Business Roundtable's Construction
Industry Cost Effectiveness Project in "1 982 concluded that construction
accidents add approximately 6.5 percent oer year to the nation's
construction exoendi tures . It was noted that the low percentage could be
explained by the fact that many OSHA regulations which were based on
National Consensus Standards were implemented in the early 1 970 ' s (much
of the capital expense, such as fire suppressions equipment, building
modifications, and extensive safety systems, were installed during this
time). The OSHA incremental costs were categorized into four classifications
as shown in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1
PERCENTAGE OF COSTS
56 - OPERATING AND ADMINISTRATIVE
37 - CAPITAL
6 - RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
1 - PRODUCT
Source: Business Roundtable Report A-52, Vol. 1, March, 1979
The 6.5 percent figure includes the effect of direct and indirect costs
and is calculated on the basis of the value of industrial, utility, and
commercial construction. It should be noted that the report omits all
intangible costs and dees not include any costs for third party lawsuits
23
against owners. ' There are distinct monetary incentives as well as
humanitarian considerations that would cause the construction industry
to reduce work site accidents.
i
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In crcer to ccta'n a data oase for determining the percentage of
construction costs scent on complying with OSHA regulations, a questionnaire
(Figure 8-1) was distributed to a selected numoer of contractors by a
Purdue University research team. All organizations aooearinq on "The
i\?. 400" list received the questionnaire. The ENR 400 reDresented a
combined domestic construction volume of S79 billion, with individual
annual volumes ranging from $40 million to S8.5 billion in 1980.
Since a large portion of the construction work done in the United
States is done by firms smaller than those listed on "The ENR 400," it
was decided to send the questionnaire to a number of organizations not
appearing on the list. These small firms might tend to relate to OSHA
regulations differently than the larger firms and it was felt that
comparing the responses of the two groups would be noteworthy. Organizations
appearing in "The OCA Directory," members of the Indiana Constructors,
Incorporated (highway, neavy, and utility contractors), and the AGC
of Indiana (Building Chapter) were sent the questionnaire.
A total of 273 usable questionnaires representing a volume of
$14.56 billion were returned.
OSHA BENEFITS AND COSTS
A majority of contractors, ranging from 72% for the Indiana Con-
structors to 841 for the OCA, felt that OSHA regulations had increased
the cost of projects with which they were involved. Most of the firms
felt that OSHA regulations applied to the type of work they performed.



















IOST 3F DSHP REGULATIONS
Have OSHA regulations increased the Hardly at all
cost of construction projects with _ . , .
which your organization is involved?
Substantial ly
Do you feel that OSHA regulations Yes No Unsure
benef i t
:
(a) The General Public
(b) The Contractor
(c) The Construction Worker
(d) Others (Please explain)
Yes No Unsure
Do you feel that the requirements of
the OSHA regulations apply to the
type of work with which your company
is involved?
Do good general construction
practices usually satisfy OSHA
requi rements?
Should the OSHA regulations be
modified? If the answer is "Yes",
please explain in the comment
section below how they may be
improved.
Do you feel that OSHA regulations
have reduced the number and
severity of construction accidents
on your projects?
Continued on the following page
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Please list the total project
cost and the approximate cost
of complying with OSHA on
projects with wnich your
organization is involved:
Buildings (Residential & Commercial
Highways
Heavy (including sewer work)
Industrial (including power plants)








Approximate Annual Construction Cost (in dollars'




Source: Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, ASCE
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;o lot :e n e-:: me general cuol-c. Sixty-one rercenc of 'The ENR 400"
.j firms indicated that OSHA rules and regulations benefited the construction
worker. It was interesting to note that the ENR firms indicated greater
OSHA benefits for the general public, contractor, and construction workers
*• than that of the smaller organizations. Also of note is the fact that
a majority of the firms felt that good general construction practices
_-! usually satisfy OSHA regulations, and that OSHA regulations should be
modi fied.
The percentage of construction costs that was estimated to be
l\ allocated for complyinq with OSHA regulations was 1.3% for Indiana
Constructors, 2.41* for the OCA (Ohio) Contractors, and 0.96% for the
ENR 400 firms. The data showed that smaller firms perceived that they
spent more to comply with OSHA regulations than the larger firms. One
^ reason for this difference may be that the type of work done by the
smaller firms is subject to higher surveillance. Another reason may be
that larger firms consider some of the OSHA regulations equivalent to
normal operating procedures and, therefore, did not compute any extra
expenditures. Still anotner reason may be the oprr.PDtion of OSHA itself,
causing contractors to inflate costs due to administrative frustration -
24




In a report performed by the Associated General Contractors (AGC)
of America in 1983, as a submission to Congress and the White House,
they cited several other problems with federal regulations in the
construction industry.
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1. OSHA requires construction contractors to retain
exposure and medical records cor up to 20 years, creating
a staggering paperwork burden.
2. Although OSHA's asbestos standard for general industry
is not workable in the highly variable construction
environment, OSHA has not proposed a separate asbestos
standard for the construction industry.
3. OSHA has cone beyond the recognized safety rules for
the construction industry to propose an overly restrictive
and burdensome standard for crane or derrick suspended
personnel platforms.
4. OSHA's policy on repeated violations requires its field
personnel to treat construction contractors' separate work
sites as if they were a single worksite.
5. OSHA has proposed an overly broad standard on underground
construction, one ianoring significant differences among
underground construction operations, such as work associated




The AGC has felt that these and other federal regulations have
caused an increase in costs on construction projects.
It was interesting to note that most contractors (both small and
large firms) indicated in a study that in the five year interval
between 1976 and 1981, that they were spending less on complying with
OSHA regulations. This may be due to a change in OSHA enforcement
policies or a change in contractors' operating procedures. The Bureau
of Labor Statistics showed that during that same time period (1976-1981),
the accident rate in construction had not substantially changed.
Owners and contractors both agree that a behavioral approach to
safety may yield more substantial results in reducing accidents. A
number of contractors have found that a good safety record gives them a
competitive advantage. Reducing the accident rate by eliminating the







experi ence rating of the zc~ciny, and thereby lowering the insurance
premiums charged to the firm. The discounted insurance rates may
return considerable dividends to the contractor. The direct cost of
accidents is usally reimbursed by workers' compensation insurance.
Construction accidents, however, generally involve substantial hidden
costs such as unproductive labor time, disrupted schedules, work slow-
downs, reduced exDertise, and lowered morale. In a study Derformed by
M.R. Robinson of Stanford University in 1979, he indicated that companies
have found that indirect costs of accidents have been as much as 17 times
?fi
higher than direct costs. Other studies were far more conservative in
their direct costs/direct costs ratio, however, all studies agree that
indirect costs exceed direct costs.
Many organs zations have found that incentive programs have been
effective in motivating workers to achieve good safety records. Prizes
and awards are given to workers with either short or long-term safety
records. These are awarded during an appropriate ceremony which is
attended by both workers and management.
Research has indicated that the attitude of management and supervision
can have a significant impact on reducing accidents. Studies involving
the efforts of top management, middle management, and foremen have con-
cluded the following in effectively reducing jobsite accidents:
1. Accept personal responsibility for improving safety
and for eliminating or correcting unsafe working methods
or condi tions .
2. Communicate and show a real concern for safety.
3. Keep job pressures low and avoid crisis situations
through effective planning.
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4. Orient or train workers, or both, to the company or the job.
SUMMARY
CSHA has begun to recognize that tie accident rate is directly tied
to safe cDerating procedures as well as labor motivation and manqeroent
concerns, therfore, OSHA has initiated innovative methods tc rq^jce
worksite injuries. In an attempt to chance the adversarial relationshiD
between labor and management, OSHA aporoved in 1979, the construction
industry's first experiment in formal, voluntary, labor-management
safety inspections. The project chosen was the San Onofre Nuclear
Power Plant for which the Bechtel Power Corporation was the construction
manager. At the site a voluntary committee assumed all responsibility
for routine safety compliance and accident prevention. Two Bechtel
representatives and two union members performed all the day-to-day
inspections. Monitoring of any complaints or violations was still performed *
!
by OSHA, and they were avai lable to handle any serious hazards. The San Onofre
experiment was a success and as a result two other sites have been chosen i
to expand the program. One site is a coal-fired power plant in Colorado,
and the other is a manufacturing/administrative building in California.
These experiments have been a positive step toward recognizing the
capabilities and responsibilities of both management and labor in
reducing worksite accidents. It also provided for additional responsibilities
for union members to use their construction know-how and experience to
prevent accidents. The benefits from these innovative ideas are reduced
accident rates, improved productivity, lower construction costs, and
reduced workers' compensation charges.
.
:
As studies have shown, the costs (both indirect and direct) of '.
I
construction accidents are 1 arge. Accident costs are approximately
i
_
5.5 :erce r t of the nation's construction evce n d':^re. Survevs snow
tnat r~ n s * rue t ; en f i r?s perceived a reduction in expenses for
complying with OSHA regulations during the five sezr ~ericd o f 1975-1981.
The decrease in construction cost *as 1.3" *"or Indiana Constructors,
2.41" for the OCA (Chi'o) Contractors, and 0.96': for the ENR 400 firms.
7'rer? was an overwhelming opinion by all f i rrs that OSHA regulations
should be modified. OSHA has made a concerted effort to reduce the
administrative burden and to allow labor and management to becone rare
involved in accident prevention. Statistics have shown that OSHA's
actions to date have not substantially contributed in reducing the
worksite accident rate. Vany firms believe that good management
practices would be equivalent to OSHA regulations, with a reduction in
costs, however, Congress saw the need for establishing OSHA only because
the industry was abusing the system ar.d wasting natural resources. The
question is still a political one and cost/benefits of public welfare
versus profit will continue to be debated.
CHAPTER NINE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA) REGULATIONS
IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRO T ECTICN AGENCY REGULATIONS ON THE CONSTRUCTION
IN i
The Environmental Protection Agency established in 1970, is designed
to serve as the public's advocate for a clean and livable envi ronment.
It is also responsible for the establishment and enforcement of
environmental standards and for administering federal laws on environmental
control
.
Environmental groups have developed large and effective lobbying
efforts ard have artfully used the news media to create public awareness
to environmental problems. The uncontrolled abuse of America's natural
resources by industrialists during the first half of the 20th century
caused public opinion to swing in the extreme favor of strong environmental
regulations by the 1970's. As a result the Environmental Protection Agency
staff grew from approximately 4,500 employees in 1970 to over 13,000
employees by 1979. Congress has poured more than $260 billioo in
cleanup measures over the last ten years. In a 1979 Business Roundtable
Report, performed by Arthur Anderson and Company, they reported that the
cost of complying with EPA regulations by firms participating in the study
was well over $2 billion. This investment accounted for 77% of all costs
of complying with federal regulations during that year. Figure 9-1
shows a breakdown of the incremental costs by classification. It was
found that approximately 90* of the incremental costs were attributable
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FIGURE 9 I ¥.?.\ INCREMENTAL COSTS SUMMARIZED BY
CLASSIFICATIONS
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to air and water regulation . The participating firms recorted that
because of the complexit' and volume of EPA regulations they incurred over
536 million, primari", in salaried labor costs, solely to maintain interna"
environmental programs and to keep current with existing regulations and
practices and to prepare for new regulations.
In the interest of public safety, Congress mandated legislature
such as the Clean Air Act and the Water Control Act with rigid standards,
and the EPA acted aggr-essi vely to ensure that firms were in strict
compliance with these laws.
Most firms have made a conscientious effort to comply with
environmental regulations, but have begun to question if the additional
costs outweigh the benefits. Companies have reported that while
reasonable measures should be taken to protect the environment, small
increments of improvement are often obtained at great cost. For example,
in the mid-1960's, a company installed precipitators for the collection
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of fly asn that reproved 95"- of the particulates emitted from ore of its
plants. In order to comply with the Clean Air Act, the company was
required to increase its efficiency so that 99.4* of the particulates
were reroved. Since that degree of efficiency could not be obtained
with its existing precipitators, it was necessary to reolace them with
new ones at approximately twice the cost of the original precipitators.
As a result the net reduction of less than 5" of particulate emission
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was achieved at twice the cost needed to achieve the first 95*.
A similar case was made by Mr. William Moorehead, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization. In the U.S. House of Representatives;
during testimony, he stated:
Now back to the regulatory problems: and at this
point, having rapped the steel industry sufficiently, I
think it time to show that this subcommi ttee is not
one-sided and that we dre concerned about the costs to
the steel industry so that it can remain comDetitive
with foreicn products.
I don't think the pace
(Mr. William Li lley) and mi
about the examples from env
regulations concerning the
by the iron and steel i ndus
places where you talk about
the best practicable techno
generate large benefits in
ahead those standards to th
standards in 1983 would res
only marginal benefits.
numbers of your testimony
ne coincide, but you do talk
ironmental regulations, EPA
discharge of water, effluence
try. This is one of the
alternatives, and you noted
logy studies in 1977 would
relation to cost; but moving
e best attainable technology
ult in monumental cost with
I have before me an internal memorandum from the
Environmental Protection Agency which I think demonstrates
this rather dramatically in figures. I will read those
figures to you and see if they are in the order of
magnitude you were talking about:
For total suspended solids under the best, the
present practicable technology, if you remove 94.8
percent, the cost per pound is 65 cents; whereas, the
alternative, removing 92.3 percent, the cost is only
43 cents per pound.
»
a .
I am net suggesting which, [t is not the jurisdiction
of this committee to say whether 94.8 percent or 92.3
percent should be the goal, but it is, I think, our function
to point out the differences between the 55 cents and 43 cents
But then when you move ahead to the best attainable
technology, (1933) the differences beccne, as you say in
your statement, monumental. The cost of removal of 100
percent of the total suspended solid by tne best attainable
technology jumos to $15.71 for the marginal increase from
approximately 95 percent to 100 percent. 29
The need for the EPA to set accurate, cost-effective standards
is critical to its impact on the economy. If not performed with fore-
sight and prudence, by the stroke of a pen many smr-ll firms could be
regulated right out of business.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS
Incorporated into the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970,
is the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), stating that "major federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment"
shall require a "detailed statement" of impacts, resources needed, and
alternatives available.
The Environmental Impact Statement gave the environmental movement
a catalyst which caused the nation to pay more attention to the environ-
ment. As a result of the 1970 Environmental Policy Act, any project
that required federal funding or licensing, i.e., dams, highways, sewers,
housing projects, arid power plants had to provide an acceptable EIS.
The EPA quickly moved to halt any project that lacked or contained
unacceptable EIS's. As part of the process of making a "detailed statement'
firms found the EIS to be voluminous, time-consuming, and very costly.
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In addition, over 50 r': of the state legislatures enacted laws
requiring EIS at the state level, which unfortunately overlapped or
duplicated federal requirements, thereby increasing preparation and
processing costs. The EIS nas resulted in the generation of a multi-
million dollar industry involving envi ronnental analysts and consultants.
The cost of compiling and processing envi ronmental impact statements
are staggering. The Bureau of Reclamation reported for fiscal year 1977,
the cost of compliance was $4.8 million. That figure did not include
the cost to the contractor in implementing environmental controls.
The preparation of the EIS has become a major component of the
contractors' bid package, and its cost is a critical criterion in
determining whether to proceed with a project. The excessive cost of
the EIS caused the Dow Chemical Company to abandon its plans to build
a new Petrochemical Plant on the Sacramento River in California.
Mr. Robert Perry of Dow Chemical commented:
There is much redundancy in the environmental impact
report process. Continued expansion of exposure
through the permit nrmting process allows any
project to be del 5 .: because of inadequate treatment
or envi ronment 3! .jestions.™
The Dow Chemical Company had spent $4 million on environmental
impact studies and permits during the two years it had attempted to
gain approval for the project.
Mr. Karl I. Rothermund, Jr., Executive Vice President of the
Ohio Contractors Association has stated: "It takes approximately
13-18 months to prepare and process an EIS in Ohio." He also stated
that in certain instances, it now costs as much money and time to
,. -, , , -^,t. „..,. . l y i.ij. i j i ^ujtf i L i .. ;> *» /»^>.wv ir»'j»JUHWBjy»ll^t ~ —iiw. i ;i-qi | , «.nw»wMty'ny
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oreoare and review an EIS as to do the engineering design for a
31
mgnway jod.
As previously stated, the EIS nas a tendency to be comorehensive
and costly. It has been reported that the EIS of a natural gas pioeline
from Alaska to the lower United States was a 17 volume document containing
9,570 pages. The EIS for a proposed Everglades Jetport cost SI. 3 million.




On the positive side, the General Accounting Office has studied the
EIS and has issued a number of findings which, if incorporated into
federal law, should make the review process somewhat faster and more
consistent, thereby resulting in tremendous cost savings Co the construction
industry. The industry itself is also now being asked to incorporate
environmental considerations into the early planninq phase of projects
where possible questionable impacts may be studied and eliminated before
actual physical damage is done, and before millions of dollars are poured
into a project that will never get off the ground. The National Association
of Environmental Professionals, an organization of individuals involved
with writing Environmental Impact Statements, has recently considered the
adoption of a code of ethics intended to limit biased work. The EPA is
developing new guidelines designed to reduce delays in its permit granting
programs. As a result of the Dow Chemical problem, the California Legis-
lature has made proposals to modify the California Environmental Quality
Act, and limit environmental impact reports. Consequently, many states







In a resort cerfoT~<ed by Koenn, Benson, and Shank in 1978, they
approximated the construction cost for social and environmental controls.
They sent a questionnai re to firms listed on "The ENR 4C0," which
represented a total construction volume of $65 billion. Smaller firms
that were listed in the OCA Directory (Ohio Contractors Association)
were also sent questionnaires. The ENR 4CC firms reported that ZA%
of their construction cost, and the OCA firms reported that 3.7% of
their construction cost, were spent in complying with Environmental
Protection Agency regulations. It was interesting to note that a majority




The EPA acts as a watchdog for the nublic to ensure that the present
generation and future generations will have a clean and livable environ-
ment. Largely due to abuses caused by industrialists was the EPA formed.
It became in the best interest of the general public to regulate those
who were adversely affecting the environment.
There have been numerous studies showing the affects of EPA
regulations on the construction industry. By an overwhelming majority
most firms agree that EPA regulations increase their construction cost.
They also tend to agree that these regulations also benefit the general
public. The controversy lies in the cost/benefits of the EPA regulations.
Most firms can live with tolerable standards, but studies have shown
that the incremental costs of getting those "last 5%" are monumental.
As a result, careful study needs to be given to set accurate and
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ireasonable standards, "he EPA must continue ~z be the puolic's advocate
for environmental matters and at the same time be acutely aware of its
impact on the economy. During the 1 970 ' s , the pendulum swung far in
favor of strong environmental controls caused by an overwhelming puolic
outcry. New that the fanfare has died down, many in the present
administration and Congress are seriously looking at ways to reduce
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CHAPTER TEN
REGULATORY REFORM
The annual budget for the 57 major federal regulatory agencies
had grown from $800 million in 1970 to over $2.0 billion by 1980. Like-
wise, the administrative staffs for these agencies swelled from 27,700
34
in 1970 to 90,500 by 1980. Clearly, the regulatory mechanism itself
was putting a tremendous strain on the taxpayer and was causing a
significant hardship on the construction industry.
With the rapid growth of governmental regulations there has also
been a growing concern that regulatory agencies have been over-zealous
and restrictive. Many construction firms have felt regulations to be
redundant and confusing. Added uncertainties caused contractor risk to
increase thereby causing his bid prices to rise to cover his risk.
Ultimately, those costs were (and are) passed on to the consumer.
EFFORTS TO REFORM BY PRESIDENT CARTER
Although regulatory reform efforts are not a new idea, the most
recent surge of reform was started near the end of the Carter administration
President Carter's regulatory reform proposals fell into three broad
categories
.
1. Review the justifications for existing and proposed rules. The idea
was that a rule should not be promulgated unless its benefits clearly
outweighed its cost. President Carter made that requirement explicit






prooosed rule was needed, to estimate its imoact on the economy oy
) performing cost/benefit analyses, and to outline alternative solutions.
2. President Carter emphasized that regulators would be held more
accountable to Congress, the courts, and to the executive branch.
3. Increased controls over regulatory actions should be given to the
President. Allow the President more authority to increase or decrease
the power of executive agencies.
President Carter used the industry-by-industry approach to score
major successes in the area of regulatory reform. In 1978, he established
the Regulatory Analysis Review Group in an attempt to improve government
cost/benefit analyses of existing regulations.
Although some agency heads wanted to expand some forms of regulation,
many of them also took steps to streamline the internal operations of
their agencies and to reduce regulations. By December 1977, OSHA had
abolished 1,100 of its more than 10,000 rules. By March 1979, the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare had eliminated 300 pages
of rules, and the FTC had cancelled 145 of its rules. President Carter's
major push was in the area of deregulation for many industries, such as
airlines, transportation, banking, and petroleum.
EFFORTS TO REFORM BY PRESIDENT REAGAN
A part of President Reagan's campaign plege was deregulation,
*- therefore, as soon as he took office he began an attack on the regulatory
':> maze. The President concentrated on a series of executive actions that
could be implemented more quickly than legislation. White House aides
and Congressional Republicans also drafted bills to revamp basic agency
laws, streamline the bureaucracy and make executive actions part of
-•' permanent legislation.
n
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Just two days after being sworn in as the nation's 40th President,
Reagan announced the creation of a Presidential Task Force on Regulatory
Relief, chaired by Vice President Bush. Reagan directed the task force
to review major regulatory proposals, assess regulations already on the
books, oversee the development of legislative proposals, and make
recommendations on regulatory personnel and how to reform regulations.
£xis€J
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Bush said the task force would be guided by three general principles
(1) Federal regulations should be initiated only
when there is a compelling need.
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(2) Alternative regulatory acoroacnes (including
no regulation) should re considered and the approach
selected that i-ocses the least possible burden on
society consistent with achieving the over-all
statutory and policy objectives.
(3) Regulatory oriorities should be governed Dy
an assessment of the benefits and costs of the
proposed regulations.
The White House imposed greater control over regulation by
establishing strict new rules on cabinet and agency regulators and gave
the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) extensive powers over the
regulatory apparatus. The President issued Executive Order 12291, which
replaced Carter's Executive Order 10244, requiring executive agencies to
prepare a regulatory impact analysis for all new and existing major
regulations
.
0MB was given authority to identify duDl ication, overlap, and conflict
in rules, which agencies were then required to rectify, develop procedures
for cost/benefit analysis, recommend changes in laws authorizing
regulatory activity, monitor compliance with executive orders, and
schedule existinq rules for agency review. In 1981, 0MB reviewed a total
of 2,803 regulations and found 87* of these regulations to be in compliance
In 1932, 0MB reviewed a total of 1,506 regulations and fcund 85* to be
in compliance.
Among the weapons that President Reagan used to attack the federal
regulatory bureaucracy , none was wielded more broadly than the budget-
cutting ax. In Fiscal Year 1982, 57 regulatory agencies received budget
cuts, with a 9" reduction in the staff. The 1983 Fiscal Year Budget saw
a spending cut of 11 and a staff reduction of 3*. The President has acted
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very conservatively and threatened to cut out entire aqencies. He has
continually curbed regulatory enforcement of existing rules and
disestablished the requi rements of coals and quotas, however, areas
of rrajor envi ronrrental concerns have not been effected.
The Bush Task Force reported that savings to industry derived from
51 revisions totaled at least $6 billion in annual recurring costs, and
an additional $9-11 billion in one-time captial investment costs. They
claimed that the administration had reduced the paperwork burden imposed






During the President's second term in office, there has been a
definite slowdown in regulatory reform; however, many of the proposed
and final regulations issued by the Reagan administration have been to
revise rules already on the books, rather than to add new ones. Others
speculate that because of stringent controls by 0MB , aqencies are
discouraged from submitting proposals that would be unlikely to survive
CMB scrutiny.
Some critics of the administration feel that the President has




agencies. By giving 0MB such broad powers, the President has his own
personal staff of regulators.
Late in 1982, the administration proposed a comprehensive A
I
regulatory reform bill, but was dashed when Congress failed to act on
35
it before they recessed. The President was not deterred however, and
.'
has continued to propose i budget cut in almost every area. Some of th
more famous legislative actions being supported by the administration
•LJ
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have been the Gra r-r-^'.:-an-'-| ol 1 i "cs Balanced Sudget Act, and t w e
Packward Tax Reform Bill.
Indications are clear that the Reagan administration has net
vanquished in its battle for regulatory reform; it has only been catching
its breath for the next round. Both the administration and Congress must
be sensitive to the public's perception of regulation and the influence
of a multitude of soecial interest groups that include business, labor,
consumers, environmentalists, and a variety of special interests.
Moreover, for all the criticism, government intervention in the American
economy is not likely to go away any time soon, while most people agree
that the system needs reform, few advocate dismantling the apparatus that
has brought so many benefits to the U.S. economy and society.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
CONCLUSION
The construction industry is in fact one or the most competitive
industries in the United States, therefore, contractors and owners alike
have to sharpen their pencils and accurately estimate the cost of
construction projects. Not only are 1 abor, material, and equipment
major factors that go into a bid, but also overhead and administrative
costs have taken a more significant part in cost estimates in the last
twenty years. Studies have shown that approximately 10* of the yearly
construction costs are allocated to regulatory controls, and the annual
budget for the sum total of regulatory agencies is in the billions of
dollars. Due to the swing of the social pendulum, regulatory agencies
saw tremendous growth in the 1 960 ' s and 70's. The federal government
acting in the "best interest" of the public sought to put a halt to the
wanton abuse of America's natural resources, discriminatory and monopolistic
business practices, and unsafe and unorthodox working conditions.
In order to comply with the new regulatory controls many construction
firms had to reorganize, reschedule, and retrain both management and its
workers. Some firms felt that the new regulations were unfair and so
harsh that they plain resisted any change. Not only did most firms
experience expensive caDital outlays to procure equipment that would
comply with OSHA and EPA rulings, but they also found that it was







voluminous recordkeeping requirements that were set by the regulatory
agencies to prove that tne firm was in compliance.
As the social pendulum reached its zenith, the President increased
the authority of certain agencies in order to put an immediate halt on
undesired practices. Consequently, several agencies began to impose
strict and severe penalties on violators, and used heavv-handed tactics
to force compliance. Construction firms reported a marked increase in
recruiting and training costs. Waqe scales steadily increased and the
inflation of the 1 970 ' s caused contractors to be more risk adverse.
These factors and others caused the construction competition to grow
keener, and even though the EEOC had affirmative action and MBE programs,
any untrained and ill-prepared contractor found himself soon out of
business.
The debate over regulatory reform continues to rage. The Davis-
Bacon Act, the MBE Program, and EPA and OSHA rulinqs, just to name a few,
are constantly before Congress and in the media. There have been
many studies done on each area of construction and they have concluded
that there are substantial costs associated in complying with federal
regulations. A closer look at these studies show that each study starts
with basic assumptions (because of the complex nature of the issue) and
then they proceed. Opposing analysts of the studies attack those
assumptions to prove just the opposite, allowing the debate to continue.
The conclusion that they all aqree on (just as good analysts should) is
that more study is needed on the subject.
This paper has presented the facts as they were found, allowing
both positive and negative aspects to be presented. The reader is




conducting research for the pacer I interviewed Mr. Patrick MaCauie or '*
the Commerce Department in Washington, D.C., and when asked how he felt
about the impact of federal regulations on the construction industry
he consented:
(paraphrased) ...that is an interesting topic and is





I personally conclude that our form of government and our society
must have regulations. Those regulations must be prudent, cost-effective, '
and in the best interest of the aeneral public. It is nearly impossible
to put an accurate value on time, human life, and a clean environment,
therefore, statistics can be misleading. I do feel that the regulatory
budget has gotten way out of hand, and that the regulatory process itself
is inefficient and is the real cause of increased cost to the consumer.
_~J
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